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Abstract 
Although the literature in international human resource management has developed greatly 
over recent years, our understanding of the dynamics of the transfer of HR practices in MNCs 
from emerging economies with subsidiaries in advanced economies is found wanting. This 
study addresses this gap in our knowledge by investigating the transfer of employment 
policies of a Brazilian MNC to its Canadian subsidiaries. It examines interrelated questions 
about the influence of an emerging-economy parent-business-system and how this interacts 
with the well-developed institutional regulation of the host in a context of complex relations 
of dependence and dominance. Our prior expectation that the MNC would have had to adapt 
its policies to the ‘Canadian way’ was not borne out by the evidence. Instead the Brazilian 
MNC was found to be adept at capturing significant components of the host country’s 
institutional setting in a manner which gave it the space to determine the ‘rules’ for its own 
advantage. That it was able to do so was, in large part, shaped by the market context of the 
firm and by Canada’s dependence on foreign investment and, in turn, by the political 
relations of dependence which such reliance engendered. Broader lessons from the case 
analysis are offered.  
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Introduction 
The study of employment relations policies and practices in multinational companies (MNCs) 
has focused in the main on companies from, and with operations in, developed economies. 
This vast and complex literature has emphasised three broadly defined influences: the role of 
institutions in the home and host country; the political relationship between actors at different 
levels in the company; and the role of market influences, particularly in the form of 
management ‘best practices’. Increasingly scholars have come to realise that rarely does one 
influence trump all others but that, more often than not, the various influences can be seen to 
act in consort. However, the extent to which such influences might be said to provide a 
theoretical purchase on explaining the practices of MNCs from developing or emerging 
economies has rarely been considered in the literature to date. There have been some studies 
of MNCs with operations in China and in Eastern Europe, but here again the focus has been 
on the extent to which the employment practices of MNCs from developed economies have 
been transferred and received in their new host environments (Gamble, 2003; Tung and 
Worm, 2001; Meardi and Tóth, 2006). Those rare studies which have looked at MNCs from 
developing economies with subsidiaries in advanced developed economies would suggest, at 
least in the case of Chinese MNCs, that they have tended to expand overseas by acquisition 
and that they have be able to ‘capture’ and assimilate new practices into the wider company 
(e.g. Rui and Yip, 2008). However, despite these advances in the literature, there remain, as 
one of the leading scholars in this area has stressed, ‘major gaps’ (Ferner 2009). 
In this paper we seek to correct for this gap by examining the case of a very large MNC 
from a parent country – Brazil – which lies outside the narrow range of home countries 
usually studied and which recently had acquired very significant operations in an advanced 
economy, Canada. The case company, MiningCo, acquired the iconic indigenously-owned 
nickel process mining company, NickelCo, in 2006.
1
 We focus in particular on the HQ’s 
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attempt to recast the subsidiaries’ reward and performance management systems. A series of 
key orientating questions are asked: what influences, if any, might be traced back to the 
company’s parent country and national business system (NBS)? Might any particular 
‘dominance effects’ be evident which might arise from the MNC’s leading position in the 
mining industry and, in turn, from it possessing the economic resources to insist that local 
actors acquiesce to its will. Or rather might it be that the adopted practices are ‘sourced’ from 
elsewhere perhaps from a ‘dominant’ or ‘hegemonic’ economy (Smith and Meiksins, 1995), 
such as the US and, in which case, management might lay claim to their being appropriate 
practices for adoption? Or could it be that the transfer of practices will be influenced to a 
greater extent by the ‘dominance’ of the host country’s institutional setting vis-à-vis the 
incoming MNC whose NBS is, by contrast, institutionally less well-developed? If that was to 
be the case, we might then expect that the host country’s institutions would bestow particular 
power resources upon the subsidiary’s workforce such that it would enabled to resist or re-
shape the policy preferences of the MNC? Of course, the empirical reality is likely to be far 
more complex and the institutional resources of local actors may in practice be highly 
differentiated. Thus, the Canadian workforce’s access to power resources may vary 
depending on particular institutional configurations and the shape and formation of political 
alliances. Thus, any easy assumption that a host country’s institutional resources are the 
inevitable property of the local subsidiary and its workforce may be problematic. 
The article is structured as follows. We turn first to provide a brief review of the main 
theoretical perspectives in the literature which is followed by a portrayal of the  Brazilian and 
Canadian NBSs in an effort to identify an appropriate analytical framework for examining the 
study’s empirical evidence. This is then followed by an explanation of the study’s 
methodology before presenting the study’s principal findings. The discussion section seeks to 
account for the major influences shaping the adoption of the HR practices in the MNC’s 
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Canadian subsidiaries and provides a series of conclusions which represent the paper’s 
principal contributions to the literature.  
Literature Review 
We identify three broad theoretical perspectives which have been used widely in the 
international HRM literature; they are the institutionalist, political and market-based 
perspectives. Institutionalism might be said to contain two broad streams. Comparative 
institutionalism focuses on the interaction of home and host country institutional systems, 
while neo-institutionalism gives emphasis to institutional duality, that is the conflicting 
pressures for isomorphism from on the one hand the host, but on the other hand the parent 
company (Ferner and Tempel, 2006; Kostova, 1999).  
In broad terms, the institutional perspective conceives of MNCs as being ‘rooted in’ 
their country-of-origin, or more specifically their NBS from which they derive particular 
institutional traits which they then export when they move abroad to establish new operations 
(Ferner, 1997). Such traits, which might be exhibited in the form of distinct capabilities or 
styles of management, are seen to be derived either from ‘hard’ institutional or regulative 
structures or from ‘softer’ cognitive or normative understandings as to that which might be 
considered appropriate managerial behaviours (Kostova, 1999; Edwards and Kuruvilla, 2005; 
Hayden and Edwards, 2001; Whitley, 1999). In Hall and Soskice’s (2001) words, institutions 
can be perceived as “rules” which companies “generally follow”, but such “rules”, we might 
emphasize, are derived both from formal and informal institutions that have evolved over 
long periods to inform particular styles of management. 
While the international transfer of employment practices may be relatively 
straightforward between countries of broadly comparable institutional settings, in cases 
where there is considerable “institutional distance” between countries’ institutional regimes, 
as highlighted, for example, in the work of Kostova (1999) and Kostova and Roth (2002), the 
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matter may be far more complex and be prone to tension and conflict. It is not that such 
distance may necessarily prohibit the MNC from implementing its preferred practices but any 
desired “attitudinal” adjustment in the host workforce’s behaviours may be partial or 
superficial (Kostova and Roth, 2002).  
The ‘political perspective’ is often found in tandem with the institutional perspective, 
certainly in its older guise, although less so in the work of neo-institutionalists such as 
Kostova (see Ferner et al.’s 2012 critique). The political perspective draws our attention to 
the manner in which various institutional resources may be marshalled and used by actors in 
the defence, or in the promotion, of their interests (Edwards et al., 2007; Edwards et al., 
2010). Thus, for example, a subsidiary’s workforce may seek to have certain employment 
practices respected and adhered to on the basis that they are legally required or that is simply 
the ‘way things are done here’ and, in which case, they may seek to mobilise their collective 
resources, perhaps through a trade union, to defend such norms. By such means a local 
workforce is seen to use its bargaining power to deflect, avoid, negotiate or challenge what is 
proposed by the MNC’s management (Ferner et al., 2012). The transfer of employment 
practices from corporate headquarters to a subsidiary is, therefore, not solely the outcome of 
some ‘rational’ decision-making process where given practices are deemed to be appropriate 
or the ‘best’, but is rather the consequence of “the interplay of interests and the possession 
and deployment of power resources by a variety of actors” (Ferner and Tempel, 2006: 31).  
For their part, MNCs may have enormous resources to draw upon which might be used 
either to directly compel a local subsidiary’s workforce to adapt and conform to the 
company’s HR practices or which could be deployed to remould or resist particular 
institutional constraints within the host economy (Almond and Ferner, 2006). There is a 
range of formal and informal mechanisms of control available to MNCs (Child, 1984). 
Subsidiaries’ employees and performance might be monitored by a series of personal and 
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bureaucratic control procedures such as through personal inspection or through specified 
procedures and rules. Both forms may operate in tandem. Ferner (2000), for example, has 
argued that the operation of bureaucratic control depends frequently on a clear shared 
understanding of tacit rules-of-the-game and consequently upon personal forms of control. In 
this way, the use of formal and informal mechanisms of control may interweave to aid the 
HQ to better impose their will and neutralise any potential resistance emanating from local 
actors. But as warranted as it is to highlight the differences in managements’ and workers’ 
interests, it also deserves emphasis that their interests overlap and are shared. Hence, the 
value of Edwards and Bélanger’s (2009: 200) use of the concept of the ‘contested terrain’: 
while actors may have distinct sets of interests they can be expected to relate in complex and 
contradictory ways. Similarly, that which is deemed to be worth defending or pursuing may 
change over time as does actors’ ability to marshal and use power resources both within and 
without the firm to good effect: hence terrains of contest can be expected to be multiple and 
shifting. Morgan (2011), too, has emphasized that the shape of the contested terrain might 
also be understood in the context of the wider macro-political setting. Thus issues such as the 
size of the MNC, the nature of the industry, the distribution of assets and employment, and 
the degree of the dependency of the host country can be expected to be important features of 
the macro-political terrain of the MNC. 
The market-based perspective’s starting point is that firms face severe competitive 
pressures, and, in an effort to retain or attain international competitive advantage, they seek 
out innovative ‘best practices’ which are then shared with or imposed upon their international 
subsidiaries (Taylor et al., 1996). A variety of managerial processes, including relatively 
unobtrusive measures like ‘benchmarking’ and ‘learning networks’ as well as more overt 
tools such as the use of ‘coercive comparisons’ where underperformance in one subsidiary 
leads to it being forced to adopt the best practices of better performing subsidiaries, might be 
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used for such purposes (Coller, 1996). Very often such ‘best practices’ are deemed to be 
‘best’ by their association with leading companies, consultancy firms or business schools in 
hegemonic or dominant NBSs (Smith and Meiksins, 1995; Kipping and Wright, 2012; 
Pudelko and Harzing, 2007). In turn, the emulation of ‘best practices’ is likely to occur 
particularly in MNCs which originate in ‘lesser’ or subordinate NBSs where specialised 
managerial competencies may be lacking (Elger and Smith, 2006; Pudelko and Harzing, 
2007; Edwards et al., 2010).  
 While Smith and Meiksins (1995) associate the presence of a ‘dominance effect’ with a 
particular ‘dominant’ country, Royle (2004; 2006) observes that a dominant MNC may come 
to exercise a pattern-making role within a given sector. Thus he found that, as McDonalds 
came to introduce alien practices in its outlets in Italy, German and Spain, they were soon 
mimicked by other indigenously-owned fast food retailers. By such means, McDonalds was 
identified as a vector for emasculating elements of countries’ industrial relations systems and 
for the cross-national convergence of employment practices within its sector.  
Although the three perspectives outlined here are derived, in the main, from studies of 
MNCs from mature advanced economies, and each in turn has certain limitations, we are of 
the view that, if adopted, as a part integrated approach where the emphasis is placed on 
deriving an understanding of the interrelationships between markets and institutions and the 
material interests of the various actors, considerable analytical purchase may be obtained 
(Edwards et al., 2007). And in that exercise we were aware that the matter of tracing the 
combined effects of varying institutional influences, derived from highly differentiated home 
and host institutional environments, in a complex context of economic dependence and power 
relations is inordinately difficult to unravel and requires very careful scrutiny. To begin our 
analysis we turn next to examine particular features of the Brazilian and Canadian 
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institutional contexts in an effort to adequately conceptualise the nature of the research 
problem. 
Institutional particularities: the cases of Brazil and Canada 
While it has become common practice to classify economies’ NBSs as being either liberal or 
co-ordinated on the basis of the co-ordinating capacity or restraining influence of their 
business and labour market institutions (Hall and Soskice 2001), any such easy classification 
has limited resonance for an emerging economy such as Brazil. We rely instead on 
Schneider’s (2009) analysis of the distinctive institutional foundations of business systems in 
Latin America which he identifies as constituting hierarchical market economies (HMEs) and 
into which Brazil fits well. HMEs are characterised by the dominance of diversified business 
groups; the significant presence of MNCs, especially of US origin; the lack of investment in 
education, training and skill development; and the weak position of organised labour. 
Overlapping each of these elements is the pervasive presence of hierarchical relations where 
employers determine – often unilaterally – patterns of work organisation and the nature and 
extent of job training; further, grievance and employee voice mechanisms are weak or absent.  
Brazil has two parallel labour markets: one formal and highly regulated, the other 
poorly regulated wherein workers lie outside the protections normally afforded by 
employment law. Four out every ten workers work in the informal market and on average 
they have been in formal education for only 6.4 years (Gondim et al., 2005; Ministério da 
Educação, 2007). Unions are weak and fragmented. It is estimated that there are 8,596 
unions, 24 union confederations and 316 federations (Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego, 
2009). While union density is reported to be relatively high in some sectors such as the public 
sector and in banking (about 27 per cent), elsewhere it is considerably lower, and is perhaps 
as low as 17 per cent when all employees are included. Unions have found it very difficult to 
gain recognition from employers (Cardoso and Gindin, 2009). The vast bulk of unions are 
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perceived to be largely ineffective in representing workers’ interests; collective agreements, 
where they exist, generally cover working hours and wages, but rarely extend to the 
organisation of work (Carvalho Neto, 2003; Bridi et al., 2007).  
For Schneider (2009) a long tradition of state intervention in labour markets has 
encouraged employers to pursue their interests directly with the state rather than engaging in 
bilateral negotiations with unions. The structure of company ownership, where many large 
companies remain in family ownership, together with the presence of large diversified 
companies where shareholding is often highly concentrated, is seen to be conducive to the 
centralisation of control. Critically, too, the presence of a small number of very large 
companies, which account for a very significant proportion of a country’s economic activity, 
and which dominate their given sectors, is seen to give rise to unequal relations – “imbued 
with a hint of coercive hierarchy” – with competitors, clients and suppliers (Schneider, 2009: 
8). Schneider further argues that the pervasive presence and reach of hierarchies has locked 
Latin American countries, including Brazil, into a particular pattern of institutional 
development in which hierarchy has come to constitute the “default preference” for the state 
and business elites, and from which it is difficult for the parties to extricate themselves. 
Brazilian scholars attribute the presence of a hierarchical and authoritarian ‘style of 
management’ to Brazil’s experience of slavery, the early formation of an elite class, the 
persistence of a highly class structured society, and the rise of ‘bureaucratic authoritarianism’ 
during the period of military rule from the 1960s to the 1980s (Carvalho Neto, 2003; Ribeiro, 
1995). However, local scholars also concede that this style of management has been tempered 
in recent years, particularly within large well-resourced Brazilian companies which possess 
the means to import management ‘best practice’, either by having their management trained 
in leading international business schools or by availing of the expertise of leading US-based 
management consultancy firms (Chu and Wood, 2008).   
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Canada is a mature well-developed western economy and is often classified, if 
somewhat uneasily, within the LME group of capitalist economies. It possesses a strong state 
which has overseen the development of a relatively dense web of legislation – both federal 
and provincial – covering labour relations and employment standards (Puri, 2009). Union 
density is relatively high (30 per cent) and in some sectors, such as mining, unions are well-
organised and relatively powerful. Relations between employers and unions have 
traditionally been adversarial and acrimonious, and while unions often exert considerable 
influence over the wage-effort bargain through collective bargaining, management rights in 
respect of the implementation of organisational changes are generally well-established and 
earnestly defended (Godard, 2009). Collective bargaining is generally conducted at a 
decentralised level and is supported by a complex infrastructure of conciliation and 
mediation. The US-based United Steelworkers Union (USW) organises workers in the mining 
industry. It is the largest private sector union in North America, accounting for 1.2 million 
members, and is widely seen in Canada to be imbued with a tradition of militancy. However, 
over the last twenty-five years unionisation rates in the industry have dropped from 48 per 
cent to 24 per cent (MiR, 2010).  
As a result of such – ostensibly at least – stark differences in the two countries’ 
institutions and traditions of employment relations, we did not expect, a priori, to witness the 
direct transfer of indigenous employment practices from Brazil to Canada. Rather we thought 
it more likely that any transferred practices would be of a different origin, conceivably from 
the US, but that the manner of their introduction and implementation would bear a distinct 
Brazilian inflection; that is, they would be introduced – or such an attempt would be made to 
have them introduced – in a unilateralist and dogged fashion. As such, we expected to 
observe three particular nationality effects; one American, one Brazilian, and the other 
Canadian. That is, we anticipated in advance that MiningCo’s corporate HQ would seek to 
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import ‘best practices’ derived from the US, but that this, together with a Brazilian style of 
management, would confront a countervailing influence, that of the host country’s 
institutions and norms which in reply would generate particular isomorphic pressures on the 
company’s Brazilian management to adapt their preferred employment policies to local 
Canadian practice and traditions. As such, we did not expect parent nationality to trump other 
influences and certainly not those of a country with mature labour market institutions and in 
an industry where union organisation and local community identification with unions was 
likely to be a strong influence.  
However, we were also aware that the interaction of these various effects was convened 
in a context of a complex web of relations of dominance both at a global and sectoral level. 
That is, Brazil is a major emerging economy and MiningCo is, by any standard, a ‘global 
player’ (described further in the method section below). In contrast, Canada is a relatively 
modest-sized economy, which relies significantly on foreign-direct investment for the 
development of its mining industry. The period of 2005-2008 was particularly significant 
with Canadian mining and steel industries undergoing major restructuring as indigenous 
companies came to merge with, or be acquired by, foreign-owned companies (Statistic 
Canada, 2012; MAC, 2012). Currently, most of the largest smelters and refineries in the 
country are owned by foreign enterprises which together account for around $60 billion in 
investment annually (MAC, 2011).  
In such a context, any a priori assumption that there might exist ‘clear blue water’ 
between the respective influences of the ‘national business systems’ of Brazil and Canada 
would need to be re-calibrated. That is, the assumption that a robust and integrated Canadian 
NBS would be strong and settled enough to block alien practices imported by a Brazilian 
MNC seemed unlikely in a context where Canadians – workers, communities and the state – 
had come to rely to a very considerable degree on foreign investment for the exploitation of 
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their natural resources and for employment creation. The matter, of course, is complicated by 
MiningCo’s mode-of-entry into Canada – by acquisition of a large long-established 
indigenous company deeply rooted in its native institutional context – which conceivably sets 
up a conflict between an ‘old’ Canadian and a ‘new’ Brazilian culture. Echoing Edwards and 
Bélanger (2009), the terrain of conflict and compromise is, therefore, likely to be multiple, 
indeterminate and contested.  
In sum, then, we expected to witness some hybridisation of practices, although in the 
round we still anticipated to observe a greater Canadian accent in that MiningCo’s policies 
would have lent more heavily towards host country practices than parent country or 
hegemonic-country practices. We also expected to witness some tension and conflict such 
that any policies would have been adapted iteratively – as one party came to understand and 
appreciate both the other’s preferences and power resources – and creatively in a manner 
which would have permitted some negotiation and compromise.   
Method 
The objective of the present paper is to understand as yet a relatively under-explored 
phenomenon: the influence of an emerging economy parent business system and its 
interaction with the well-developed institutional regulation of a host country in matters of 
employment practice. To this end, we opted to undertake an in-depth case-study analysis of a 
Brazilian MNC’s subsidiary operations in Canada.  
Brazil was chosen as a country of origin for two reasons: first, to reiterate, it is a large 
and important emerging economy (the seventh largest in the world); and second, it is a strong 
example of a hierarchical market economy, as described above. The case study company, 
MiningCo, is a large Brazilian MNC which has grown exponentially in the past twenty years 
to become one of the largest mining companies in the world. It is a former state-owned 
company which was privatised in the late 1990s. It employs close to 150,000 workers and has 
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direct investments in 38 countries. Its controlling group is composed primarily of Brazilian 
nationals as is its board of directors. The vast bulk of its workers are Brazilian (80 per cent) 
and 60 per cent of its assets are located in Brazil. It might be objected, however, that 
MiningCo is not a typical Brazilian MNC: first, it is a former state-owned enterprise with – 
one might expect – a distinctive state enterprise heritage, and second it is a natural resources 
firm. While the latter may have some implications for the study’s ability to generalise to other 
economic sectors, and we will return to this in the paper’s conclusion, the former need not 
disqualify the company for consideration. We argue that it provides a clear conceptual 
benefit, in that MiningCo’s state enterprise heritage usefully serves to magnify the impact of 
Brazil’s hierarchical centralist business culture, and, as such, serves as a suitable proving 
ground for an assessment of the nature and consequence of ‘Brazilian’ influences. We thus 
submit that MiningCo is ‘a case of’ a Brazilian MNC.  
Canada was chosen as a case host country because it is widely classified in the 
international literature as a mature liberal market economy. In recent decades it has become 
increasingly dependent on foreign-owned firms for the exploitation of its natural resources. 
At this latter level, the ‘case’ is seen as ‘typical’ of a trend – the internationalisation of a 
major industrial sector by a foreign company.  
In examining MiningCo’s employment policies in Canada we focus on its rewards 
management system. This is often thought to be a critical area of HRM where corporate 
management are often advised to be “culturally sensitive” (Schuler and Rogocsky, 1998); that 
is, to adapt their policies to suit local traditions and norms. Certainly, the research evidence to 
date across different institutional settings would suggest that local isomorphic pressures are 
particularly pronounced with respect to this area of HRM. For instance, Liberman and 
Torbiörn (2000) case study of a MNC found that, despite management’s efforts to transfer a 
standardised performance management systems across the various European subsidiaries, 
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there were significant variations in local practice. The same has been found even in instances 
where MNCs from mature developed economies move to emerging economies such as China 
(Lindholm, 1999).  
In sum, the study’s ‘case’ is conceived of in the following terms. It is first a study of a 
Brazilian MNC: the company originates in Brazil, is based in Brazil, remains for the greater 
part Brazilian-owned and is Brazilian managed. It operates primarily in the natural resources 
sector, in which it occupies a major presence internationally. It has expanded overseas by 
acquisition and by establishing new operations. It is a major employer in many of its host 
economies, including Canada. Thus, the case company is conceived of as a “strong Brazilian 
firm” or as the “dominant” player in its sector in the sense as thought of by Royle (2006). The 
study is concerned to examine how such a “strong Brazilian firm” seeks to manage the 
recasting of its rewards management system in its subsidiaries in a country – Canada – whose 
business system is of some considerable “institutional distance” from that of Brazil’s. At this 
level, the study is conceived of as an examination of the interaction of an emerging 
economy’s parent business system with the regulatory institutions of a well-developed mature 
liberal market economy. However to reiterate, the matter cannot be conceived of in purely 
institutional terms. First, the interaction of two business systems takes place in a context of 
complex political relations wherein an institutionally mature host country is dependent on the 
investment of a major foreign investor. Second, the case company did acquire, as we will 
examine further below, the expertise of foreign consultancy firms in a bid to adopt 
managerial ‘best practices’. Such “substitution” for institutional deficits in the parent 
country’s business system thus admits to the potential absorption of US hegemonic 
management practices. By such means, a particular parent country business system effect – 
that of a hierarchical centralism – might come to be interwoven with hegemonic US ‘best 
practice’. In brief, then, the study is an examination of a case of the transfer of a distinctive 
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‘emerging’ parent-country management style braided with hegemonic – US-derived – ‘best 
practice’ in a complex context of relations of dominance and dependence. 
Data collection and analysis 
The data are derived from in-depth semi-structured interviews, documentary sources, and 
direct observation. Twenty-eight interviews were conducted between July 2009 and August 
2010. These were supplemented by e-mail communication and telephone interviews with two 
respondents in January 2013 of one hour duration each. Excluding these and three other 
interviewees who refused to allow their views to be recorded, all other interviews were 
recorded providing in total over nineteen hours of tape recording. The interviews were later 
transcribed. At the Brazilian headquarters, the global HR Director, three global HR managers, 
two senior managers in international training and rewards, two managers involved in 
international workforce planning, one manager in the international remuneration position, 
two managers responsible for global mobility, and the industrial relations director were 
interviewed. A former HR Director was also interviewed. Three trade union directors 
representing the three main Brazilian central unions – Central Única dos Trabalhadores, 
Força Sindical, and União Geral Trabalhadores – were also interviewed with respect to their 
views of MiningCo’s employment policies both at home and abroad, and particularly in 
respect of developments in the Canadian subsidiaries.  
In Canada, interviews were conducted with two Brazilian expatriates (one senior 
finance manager and one HR manager), and nine Canadian managers (three HR managers, 
one corporate affairs director, one strategic director, one training manager, one recruitment 
manager, and two compensation managers). Among the nine Canadians interviewed, three 
managers had been working for the former company, NickelCo, before its takeover by 
MiningCo. These three interviewees were key informants since they were able to highlight 
any differences between MiningCo’s and NickelCo’s style of management and HR practices.  
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One senior trade union official, who was in charge of the strike (described in the empirical 
findings below), was interviewed at the USW union headquarters in Toronto. Interviews with 
Brazilian interviewees were conducted in Portuguese and with Canadians in English.
2
    
The documentary sources included: 69 company annual reports from 1942 to 2010, the 
company’s website, sixteen papers about MiningCo presented at the Encontro Nacional de 
Programas do Pós- Graduação em Administração from 1995 to 2009; seven books recording 
the company’s history, and a documentary film. The latter provided important information on 
the way the company was managed under state ownership as well as its subsequent 
privatisation. Print media sources were also analysed, including 1,144 articles about the 
company which appeared between 1968 and 2010 in Veja (a weekly Brazilian magazine) and 
3,579 articles from the period 1994 to 2010 in Folha de São Paulo (probably Brazil’s most 
highly-regarded daily newspaper). A further 1,140 articles in the Toronto Star Newspaper’s 
archives from 1985 to 2010 were reviewed. Other secondary data sources examined in 
Canada included the USW website as well as various websites’ news reports and videos of 
the strike action from October 2009 to August 2010. These sources were particularly useful 
in our analysis of the manner in which MiningCo’s policies and style of management were 
understood by the workforce and the union as well as providing details on the actions 
undertaken by the striking workers. 
The documents, interviews, articles, and videos were transcribed and transposed into a 
computer file to help undertake a deductive content analysis of the data contained therein. No 
computer-aided software was used for analysing the interview data, principally because the 
study was conducted in two different languages, Portuguese and English. Translating the 
interviews and secondary data into a second language would increase the likelihood of 
incorrect translation and misinterpretation. Instead, a qualitative form of content analysis was 
conducted (Krippendorff, 2004). The basic unit of analysis chosen was the sentence related 
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by key words grouped as categories to produce a ‘cluster’. Three aggregate dimensions were 
identified: MiningCo in Canada and the subsidiary’s purpose and structure; transfer of 
rewards policies; and structures of control and Canadian constraints. In order to confirm the 
internal consistency of the data analysis and the reliability of the identified categories, the 
files were coded twice by the same researcher, a process which Krippendorff (2004) has 
termed ‘stability reliability’. No significant differences were found with each categorisation.  
Finally, we should comment on the merits or otherwise of drawing conclusions from a 
study, which, by happenstance, coincided with an open conflict of rare proportion. We make 
the following observations. First, strikes in the Canadian mining industry are not a 
particularly uncommon event, albeit one as embittered and as prolonged as the one witnessed 
here is. Second, a strike cannot simply be considered unique. It is, as Edwards and Bélanger 
(2009) argue an extreme illustration of a general phenomenon; that is, workers have their 
own concerns and interests which may lay unstated and undefended until prompted by some 
particular managerial action. Thus we must see the potential for conflict, whether dormant or 
expressed – even in the very embittered form seen here – as ‘normal’. The important task is 
to assess the extent to which the outcomes described in this study might be explained by 
institutions, market forces, power relations or more simply by a MNC’s behaviour in a 
specific context. We turn to this task now. 
MiningCo in Canada: subsidiary’s purpose and structure 
At the time of our study, MiningCo had a regional HQ office in Canada with about 80 
employees and four sites in three provinces. One site contained a nickel mine which is among 
the largest mines in the world and employs about 3,200 workers. Another site produces a 
platinum-group metals concentrate and cobalt metal and employs about 150 people. 
Activities in third subsidiary comprise two underground mining operations, a smelter, and a 
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refinery employing 1,300 employees. The fourth site was another nickel mine and employed 
420 workers.  
The takeover of NickelCo brought with it significant changes for its former Canadian 
employees. Prior to its acquisition, Canada accounted for 47 per cent of NickelCo’s revenues; 
post-acquisition, it accounted for a mere 4 per cent of MiningCo’s revenues. Thus, almost 
overnight, NickelCo went from being ‘a big fish in a small pond to being a small fish in a 
very big pond’. Second, NickelCo had operated a decentralised management model where 
managers enjoyed a high degree of local autonomy. Post-acquisition, MiningCo centralised 
all strategic decisions in Brazil, together with establishing a new managerial hierarchy as well 
as sending expatriate staff to assume senior managerial positions in Canada. A new ‘global 
model’ of HR management, which was developed with the help of American consultancy 
firms such as McKinsey, Accenture, and Booz Allen, was also implemented. The 
introduction of this standardised global model was designed to ensure that the Canadian 
subsidiaries would adopt a common set of HR policies and practices, as observed at the HQ: 
We are not changing because of differences in the countries. If you are in a school, 
you have to wear the uniform whether you like it or not; if you won’t wear it, so 
you change your school (Brazilian senior corporate manager, interviewee J, 
December 2009).  
 
This model and its associated guidelines were read by Canadian managers as the 
company’s way of saying, ‘thou shalt’: that is, they were to be obeyed without question. Any 
attempt to question or argue the merits of a particular policy was perceived by Canadian 
managers to have been interpreted in Brazil as acts of resistance. 
People would just accept them [… policies and practices] because Brazil said, ‘you 
have to have it’. We can’t challenge them and we’ve got our hands slapped when 
we tried to (Canadian manager, interviewee Q, February 2010). 
 
Since MiningCo has taken over, it has been a very different relationship. It is more 
a hard-line approach from the company, there is no negotiating. MiningCo is not 
meeting in the middle. With the company it is all taken as, it ‘is our way, and it is 
final’ (Canadian trade union member, interviewee Y, February 2010).   
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The point to be highlighted here is that, while the policies and practices adopted by MiningCo 
were different to those which had been used by NickelCo, the Canadian managers were 
familiar with them; they had seen them implemented in other firms, particularly of US origin. 
Their objection was not so much with the policies themselves but with the crude and 
unilateralist manner of their introduction.  
I don’t think there is a big difference in the practices they are using; it is how they 
execute them. So with the US firms in Canada even though they’re different (the 
HR practices), they still broach the way that they go about implementing policy. 
So, Canadians and Americans will discuss, there will be debates, you are still part 
on the equation. So, yes, we are using the same benchmarking practices, it is how 
you go about the implementation that is different (Canadian manager, interviewee 
N, February 2010) 
 
Where the gap exists is in the implementation and execution. They try to copy (US 
practice), but the implementation is different. They know how to implement in 
Brazil. Now, how to implement things in a different setting is a challenge. It has 
been an absolute disaster in North-America. They work brilliantly in Brazil. They 
won’t work here (Canadian manager, interviewee X, February 2010). 
 
In the end, management came to accept the policies implemented by MiningCo in Canada, 
albeit with considerable disquiet and objection to the manner of their imposition. Despite, or 
perhaps because of, this, there was little, if any, scope for management-worker alliances to 
develop to resist the imposition of the company’s reward and benefit policies. 
 
The transfer reward and benefit policies from Brazil to Canada 
Our analysis now turns to focus on the transfer of the company’s reward and benefits policies 
from Brazil to Canada. We look first at those elements which attracted the least levels of 
resistance from local management and workers. These included the company’s employee 
health and illness policy, the travel policy, and the housing benefit policy. We move then to 
consider the more complex and contested issues of the implementation of pay-for-
performance as well as changes to the bonus system and the employees’ pension scheme.  
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Employees had been entitled to a free annual doctor health check-up. This was 
withdrawn unilaterally. Its termination was received poorly by local management. One senior 
manager, who strongly disagreed with the HQ’s decision, complained that “all of the 
companies out there give an annual medical visit”. In response to this criticism, the Toronto 
office was asked by HQ to conduct a survey to determine whether a similar benefit was 
provided by other MNCs in Canada. In this instance the relevant manager, who had also 
queried other new practices, was perceived by MiningCo as being “extremely resistant” and 
was promptly demoted. This was the first instance where local staff queried and sought to 
resist changes in their conditions of employment following the MiningCo acquisition. The 
matter remained unresolved when our research was completed. Nonetheless, one manager in 
the HQ observed that they expected resistance: 
We have had some differences of conduct and priorities and we needed to be 
authoritative in some cases. So, we expected to have a level of resistance (Brazilian 
middle-ranking corporate manager, interviewee B1, August 2010). 
 
We turn next to review changes in the company’s travel policy. Staff allowances were 
determined on the basis of employee’s seniority. Thus, the class of airline ticket (economy or 
business), hotel grade and per diem allowances varied depending on an employee’s position 
within the organisation. Prior to the MiningCo takeover, there were no such distinctions; all 
such allowances were harmonised across occupational grades. The new MiningCo policy was 
perceived as creating new “class” divisions within management to the extent that some junior 
managers reported feeling “not valued” and “disrespected”. While it was appreciated that 
such a policy might have been the norm in Brazil, the Canadian staff highlighted their 
preference for maintaining a common allowance policy on the basis that such non-
discrimination was key to securing staff commitment to the organisation. The policy, 
however, was implemented without discussion, or adaptation to local norms or preferences. 
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When the updated travel policy came out and it was sent to us, it was very difficult for 
us because basically the travel policy for air flights is by levels. I can’t stay at the 
same hotel (as my colleague) unless she downgrades. I am not allowed to spend as 
much on food as my manager is. From a Canadian perspective, it is offensive to us… 
(It’s) saying that someone more junior is not valued or respected as much as 
somebody who is more senior (Canadian manager, interviewee Q, February 2010). 
 
At MiningCo’s HQ, management accepted that views on the travel policy did differ along 
national lines: 
In fact, in Brazil we differentiate more. We differentiate between different 
hierarchical levels; it is a cultural influence. In Canada, it is not the same 
(Brazilian middle-ranking corporate manager, interviewee B1, August 2010). 
 
Another controversy occurred in relation to a housing benefit which the former owners had 
introduced. It had operated thus: when management asked an employee to relocate from one 
workplace to another within the company and if that person was unable to sell their home, the 
company would buy it from them, and then sell it on in the normal way at a later date. 
MiningCo’s executives perceived this policy to be “too paternalistic”, and discontinued the 
practice. While workers expressed their dissatisfaction, they believed they had to accept it: no 
other company in the industry had ever provided such a benefit. 
The most noteworthy changes in the company’s reward policies – and the ones which 
generated the most resistance – were the introduction of a pay-for-performance (PRP) scheme 
and the substitution of a defined-benefit pension plan with a defined-contribution scheme for 
new non-managerial employees. With the former, 50 per cent of managers’ and 24 per cent of 
workers’ annual earnings was to be based on their work performance with a further variable 
bonus payment which was capped at 6 per cent of earnings and was linked to the market price 
of nickel. The PRP scheme was to operate in the same way for both managers and workers on 
the following basis: individual employee’s performance (50 per cent), department’s 
performance (25 per cent), and the company’s overall performance (25 per cent). While there 
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was no resistance from the management group to these changes, the manner of their 
introduction was a cause of concern. 
Pay-for-performance, that is fine, but just the fact that you told us today and it is 
happening tomorrow and we don’t have any context, and we don’t understand why, 
we haven’t had time to get used to the idea; we have to talk about it. That has 
caused a lot of angst, and, unfortunately, mistrust (Canadian manager, interviewee 
R, February 2010). 
 
At the company’s HQ, however, it was observed that the PRP would be implemented in all 
subsidiaries: 
MiningCo has this aggressive attitude regarding pay-for-performance. It is more 
aggressive than what is usually found in the market place. Sometimes it is not well 
accepted in other cultures, but we still implement it (Brazilian lower-level 
corporate manager, interviewee H, August 2009). 
 
Prior to the acquisition of NickelCo, payment from the nickel price bonus payment scheme 
was triggered when the price of nickel reached CAD$2 a pound; there was no cap, but in 
order for workers to receive the bonus, the Canadian mines’ net pre-tax operating earnings 
had to be positive. During the 1980s and 1990s when the price of nickel on international 
markets was low the bonus payment cost NickelCo little, but as markets recovered in the early 
2000s and with it the price of nickel, workers’ earnings grew exponentially. On some 
occasions, workers’ bonus payments came close to matching their base earnings which 
provided them with a total income, in some cases, in excess of $120,000 a year. While 
MiningCo was prepared to continue with the bonus scheme, it imposed an annual cap of about 
$12,000. 
The defined-benefit pension plan was widely seen to be a generous pension scheme. For 
example, an employee who had worked for NickelCo for 30 years received $3,000 a month. 
MiningCo argued that the plan was too costly and undermined the profitability of the 
Canadian subsidiary. The Brazilian managers decided to discontinue the defined-benefit plan 
for new employees and replace it with a defined-contribution plan.  
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The employees objected to the new payment system on two grounds: first, the revised 
bonus scheme would result in a significant reduction in their earnings; and second, they 
argued that management would not be capable of discriminating fairly between employees’ 
performance levels. Supported by the USW, which represented 70 per cent of the employees, 
the unionised workers voted for strike action which culminated in a 12-month all-out strike in 
two subsidiaries, while in the third, 250 of the 400 employees engaged in an eighteen month 
strike. The fourth subsidiary had already negotiated a three-year agreement in 2008. The 
union decided on a strategy of co-ordinating simultaneous strike action across the three 
subsidiaries, which was designed to maximise the union’s leverage. The strike was to become 
one of the longest and most embittered private sector strikes in Canada. “This is a fight like 
no other”, said a senior union representative, who had been on strike at least six times with 
NickelCo over the course of three decades.
3
 
From the outset, the company adopted an aggressive posture in the face of the strike. It 
established a set of “pre-conditions”, which included acceptance of the defined contribution 
pension plan for new employees and the adoption of PRP, before it would enter negotiations. 
A leading Canadian law firm was hired to lead both the company’s negotiations with the 
union and to frame its legal strategy. The latter culminated in the company seeking court 
orders to limit the number of striking workers on picket lines; taking civil contempt hearings 
against union leaders; challenging Labour Relations Board decisions; as well as levying 
multi-million law suits against the union for infringements on picket line protocol, for 
information posted on the union’s website, and for a blockade staged by community and 
individual union members. Together with redeploying supervisors, clerical workers, 
engineers, geologists, and maintenance workers, as well as being able to draw on miners who 
refused to go on strike (who were quickly dubbed as ‘scabs’ by striking workers), the 
company was able to maintain production levels at 30 per cent of capacity during the strike. 
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Seven months into the strike, MiningCo went a step further and brought in significant 
numbers of replacement workers. While it is illegal for a company in Canada to fire striking 
workers, if a strike persists for more than six months, management are permitted to recruit 
replacement employees. NickelCo had always desisted from using replacement workers 
during previous disputes, even in the case of an eight-month long dispute in 1978-79 when 
11,600 workers went on strike. This departure in management strategy placed the strikers in a 
vulnerable position; at this point the company was legally entitled to offer a permanent job to 
any replacement worker, and moreover was not obliged to re-instate any striking worker even 
if a new collective agreement was eventually reached. Not surprisingly, MiningCo’s strategy 
was perceived by the unions as a significant escalation of the conflict. 
It is very, very disturbing. All the history of NickelCo, the 100 years of NickelCo 
they had never started an operation with scabs or with replacement workers. This 
company does not hesitate to start operations no matter who they use, no matter 
how much they produce; they will start operations (Senior USW official, 
interviewee Y, February, 2010).  
 
They (NickelCo) had never brought in replacement workers. So all of this is like 
history being made. Usually when you are in the union you feel protected, but this 
is the first time that they are probably feeling vulnerable (Canada manager, 
interviewee M, February 2010). 
 
The company, on the other hand, was determined to implement the policies, as observed by a 
manager at corporate HQ: 
We are not giving in, we are not. I do not blame NickelCo for having giving in (in 
the past), because they had 35% of their business in Canada and this placed the 
company in a weak situation. We are not in a weak situation (Brazilian middle-
ranking corporate manager, interviewee K, December 2009).  
 
The anxiety and bitterness in turn generated a wave of prejudice and xenophobia, with 
striking miners retorting: “MiningCo is trying to import Brazilian third world standards”. 
Media reports included images of Brazilian flags being burnt, people urinating on maps of 
Brazil and on MiningCo’s logo, together with slogans saying, “Let’s kick MiningCo out of 
Canada”. Some MiningCo workers who had crossed the picket line had their homes and cars 
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vandalised while others received death threats. In turn, the company fired nine workers, three 
of whom faced criminal charges. 
The response of political actors to the strike was far from uniform. A local mayor 
condemned the company’s use of replacement workers, two provincial premiers adopted a 
conciliatory tone and tried to prevail upon MiningCo management to return to negotiations 
and to settle the dispute, while at the federal level, politicians exerted pressure on the striking 
workers to cease their protest. One senior federal cabinet minister, for instance, argued that 
MiningCo’s takeover of, and investment in, NickelCo had saved it from bankruptcy and 
prevented the local area from becoming a ‘valley of death’. In an interview with a provincial 
newspaper he tried to impress upon the striking workers that without MiningCo, "there was 
going to be no buyer, there were going to be no jobs, there weren't going to be any capital 
investments; there was going to be no employer.” But apart from the expression of such 
statements of concern, government representatives remained at arms’-length from the dispute. 
This had the effect of creating the necessary ‘political’ space within which the company could 
seek to compel the workers to accept its terms.  
By the summer of 2010 the workers were dejected and disheartened and were no longer 
in a position to prolong the strike. The timing of the strike had not been fortuitous. The price 
of nickel had fallen significantly against the backdrop of the international recession, falling 
demand and excess supply.
4
 Following a union ballot in support of a return to work, 
management pressed ahead with the introduction of the PRP pay scheme and the new pension 
plan. The concessions made by the company were modest. There was a slight adjustment to 
the nickel price bonus which was increased from six per cent to eight per cent of base 
earnings and the PRP component was reduced from 24 per cent to 22 per cent, but otherwise 
the new payment scheme remained unchanged. After the strike, MiningCo opened new nickel 
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mines in Indonesia, Goa, and Onça Puma (Northern Brazil) in order to reduce the company’s 
dependence on Canadian-sourced nickel.  
Discussion and conclusion 
We turn first to provide a causal account of the empirical evidence reviewed above and to 
distinguish between influences which are structural, institutional and contingent in form. To 
reiterate, the study found that the Canadian subsidiaries’ management felt compelled to 
implement the ‘global HR model’ of the parent company. In turn, the workforce was unable to 
resist the changes in local HR practices, despite having mounted one of the most protracted 
strikes in Canadian mining history. The empirical evidence illustrates the manner in which the 
MNC was able to manoeuvre adroitly through the constraints of the Canadian institutional 
context by the clever and successful deployment of its resources. This contrasts with the 
inability of the Canadian workforce to operate as successfully. That the latter struggled, while 
the MNC succeeded, to take advantage of their potential power resources – both as derived 
from the institutional context and their collective power – is complex and multi-layered. First, 
there is the market context of the firm, and second and closely related there is the strategic 
capacity of the actors. With regard to the former, there were two elements. First, there was the 
depressed market for nickel and its consequent low market price. In this context of a 
particular market conjuncture, management were given the space to neutralise the threat posed 
by the workers’ strike action. More prosaically, the strike might be said to have played into 
management’s hands by affording them the opportunity to wait-out a recovery in the demand 
and price for nickel. For workers to have been able to press home the potential advantage of 
industrial action, the broader sectoral-market contingencies would have had to have been 
framed in a manner that was more favourable to such action. In addition, there was the 
Canadian political establishment’s championing of foreign-direct investment. Such a 
relationship of dependence created a context within which politicians’ support at provincial 
28 
 
and federal level for the case as advanced by the workers and their unions remained at best 
muted and at worst absent. It was by such inert actions – in manner which resembles Lukes’ 
(1974) second face of power, the power of ‘non-decision-making’ – that the state came to 
stand ‘alongside’ the company and to be leagued against the workforce. 
Second there is the strategic capacity of the MNC and of its Canadian workforce. The 
MNC’s management showed themselves to be adept at mobilising local resources and 
expertise (i.e., that derived from a local legal and public relations consultancy firm) and in 
harnessing the support of the political class, whereas the workforce showed itself to be 
comparatively less accomplished. Such a judgement might be read to be unduly harsh; after 
all, the workers may not have foreseen the manner in which the price of nickel would have 
remained subdued or the extent to which the company would have remained resolute in facing 
down the strike, or the success management would have had in marshalling the support of 
public representatives at a federal level. However, they certainly came to appreciate that they 
faced a powerful adversary – to prolong a strike for 12 months would indicate as much. While 
it might be unfair to claim that the union made a strategic error and/or was foolhardy in 
opposing the MNC, it is probably fair to judge that it misjudged the consequences of the 
state’s increasing dependence on foreign investment and the consequent delimiting of its 
capacity to intervene politically on the side of labour. As such, the union failed to appreciate 
the wider significance of the political context and relations of dependence which existed 
between the state authorities and MiningCo.  
Within this context, then, of particular structural contingencies, MiningCo showed itself 
to be adept at deploying its resources and influence to evade the ostensible constraints of the 
host institutional system. This is best exemplified by the company’s replacement of striking 
workers and its use of the Canadian law firm in its campaign against the striking workers. 
Both examples illustrate well the manner in which the MNC was able to use provisions of the 
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institutional context to its own advantage. In the case of the former, by adhering to the 
regulatory letter of the legal code, as opposed to its normative spirit (as NickelCo had done in 
the past), MiningCo was able exploit a particular institutional resource for its own advantage. 
In contrast, the union had derived a false sense of security from the forbearing posture which 
NickelCo had assumed in previous disputes and had failed to foresee the willingness and the 
capacity of MiningCo not to play by the old implicit rules of the game. The MNC’s 
recruitment of a leading law firm enabled the MNC to mobilise hard-headed local institutional 
expertise for their own gain and to ‘game’ the very institutional context that might otherwise 
have been seen as constraining it.  
That MNCs seem increasingly capable of evading the apparent constraints of host 
countries’ NBSs is one that has been commented widely upon in the international business 
literature, and in some cases has been well-developed empirically, but rarely if ever has it 
been demonstrated in the context of a MNC from an emerging economy with operations in a 
mature developed economy. This study is especially strong in showing the dynamics and 
processes involved and, in particular, in locating the micro-politics of the MNC within a 
wider macro-political terrain as called for by Morgan (2011). We have seen how institutional 
contexts cannot be read as predetermined or rigid ‘givens’, but are malleable resources which 
allow considerable scope for actors to exploit their potential in a variety of ways which are 
not fixed a priori. In the context of the strike, we might point in particular to the ‘answering 
postures’ assumed by political actors at the three different levels of governance – local 
(mayor), provincial (governors), federal (government ministers) – with the first siding with 
the workforce and condemning the stance of the MNC, the second group striving for an 
accommodation between the varying factions, and the third supporting the company. Such 
variable political stances are linked to the varying ‘pressure points’ of labour and capital with 
the former’s interests being more manifest at a local level. In contrast, the company’s interests 
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were rehearsed and justified by political actors at the most senior of levels. Such evidence 
points to the manner in which the institutional resources of local actors is in practice highly 
differentiated depending on which group is being considered. Thus we might emphasize that, 
as the MNC might be appropriately conceived as a ‘contested terrain’ so, too, might the host 
institutional context as different actors within and beyond the MNC seek to identify and 
exploit any available ‘institutional space’ for their advantage, deploying a variety of resources 
as they so do. This represents a significant contribution of this case study to the literature. 
We turn now to consider whether there was an evident ‘Brazilian’ effect at work in 
guiding the behaviour of the case company. It is clear from the empirical material that the 
firm’s style of management was forceful and assertive, and that it pressed hard to have its HR 
practices, which had been developed with the help of leading US consulting firms, adopted in 
its Canadian subsidiaries. This begs the question, however, whether this represents a uniquely 
Brazilian influence or whether any other MNC, irrespective of its national origin, would have 
acted in the same manner where it was determined to introduce its preferred policies? The 
answer is, possibly yes. Certainly there is a history of employers in the Canadian mining and 
refining industries adopting hard-line postures in the face of union strike action. Moreover, 
the international literature is replete with instances of MNCs taking strident efforts to have 
their employment practices introduced even in contexts where the host institutional regime is 
evidently more rigid than that of Canada. Consider for example Almond and Ferner’s (2006) 
study of US MNCs in Europe as well as Royle’s (2000) study of McDonald’s in Germany. 
But the telling point from prior research is that, while some firms seek to avoid a host 
country’s institutional constraints, others seem content to work within them. The matter often 
seems to turn on a company’s motives and abilities to operate in a particular way (Edwards 
and Bélanger, 2009). As such, it is not enough to claim that the firm was distinctly Brazilian 
in its approach. What is key is that its inclination to adopt a particular parent-country style of 
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management – and for it to be successful – was facilitated by a conjuncture of influences 
which included the firm’s leading global sectoral role, its extensive resources and its 
relationship of dominance with the host country’s state authorities. Thus any consideration of 
an evident Brazilian influence must be placed in the wider context of economic and political 
relations, which themselves were shifting and being recast. It was Canada’s dependence on 
foreign direct investment which facilitated the outcome witnessed here. In other words, the 
increasing internationalisation of Canada’s mining industry has reduced the rigidity and 
robustness of the former local institutional settlement (between the state and the unions) and 
has thereby facilitated in this case a Brazilian MNC to implement – even in the face of stern 
resistance – its chosen employment policies in a manner which was distinctly ‘Brazilian’. 
We make two further observations. The first refers to the existing literature. There has 
been a tendency in the literature, and certainly in the institutional perspective, to view parent 
country and host country effects as discrete influences thereby encouraging a dichotomous 
form of explanation; that is, that the former is often identified as a resource of the MNC and 
the latter a resource of the local subsidiary and its workforce (Edwards et al., 2007; Edwards 
et al., 2010). Such a neat binary division does little to capture the dynamics of MiningCo’s 
relationship with its Canadian subsidiaries. Ultimately the extent to which the institutional 
resources of the host country came to be exploited by the company was dependent on its prior 
power resources. MiningCo’s power rested on its sheer size and dominant position in the 
market place and relatedly any decision it might make to invest in, or divest out of, Canada, 
and, in turn, on the Canadian authorities dependence on it for employment and community 
prosperity. Secondly, and relatedly, an examination of such ‘strong firms’ behoves a class 
analysis of MNCs which has been absent from much of the international business literature, 
and particularly the institutional perspective. In this study, as the Canadian state became ever 
more dependent on foreign-owned enterprises, the political space to intervene on the side of 
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the local workforce was commensurately reduced. In these terms, an over-reliance on a 
‘local’-‘foreign’ institutional analysis misses the overarching class basis of the terms of the 
‘contested terrain’. 
Finally, the issue of whether and to what extent this case analysis might speak to other 
MNCs from other HMEs deserves consideration. Naturally with a case study of one company 
from one industrial sector and from one HME there are limitations to such an exercise. Still, 
we believe the following points are warranted. We make the case in this paper that MiningCo 
behaved in a distinctly ‘Brazilian’ fashion, particularly in respect of its hierarchical 
centralism, but that it had also adopted a distinctively US ‘management sensibility’5 (US-
style package of global uniform HR practices), reflecting the macro-level hegemony of the 
US model. That is, the firm’s ‘style of management’ and modus operandi was ‘Brazilian’, in 
that it was coercive and forceful in a manner consistent with Schneider’s (2009) 
conceptualisation of firms originating from HMEs, but the specific content of its HR policies 
was informed by US ‘best practice’. We argue that, while this coercive hierarchical style of 
management is deeply rooted in Brazilian culture, its expression in Canada was facilitated by 
a particular pattern of economic and political relations. Thus while we might conceivably 
expect other Brazilian MNCs and perhaps also MNCs from other HMEs to endeavour to 
adopt an assertive or forceful style of management, and perhaps combined too with the 
adoption of US-derived ‘best practice’, the extent to which this might be realised in a fashion 
close to that found here is likely to be contingent on the ‘strength’ of the particular MNC in 
the market place and in the host economy.  
Such issues obviously lead to a consideration of the hoary chestnut of the role of 
emerging economies’ MNCs in generating convergence in HR practices within sectors and 
across economies. There are two possible vectors for such a process: one is direct, the other 
indirect. With respect to the former, there is the likelihood that MNCs from HMEs, and 
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particularly those from less developed and complex business systems, will draw upon 
international ‘best practice’, and, in so doing, will come to act as vehicles for the diffusion of 
US hegemonic practices. With regard to indirect effects, we would suggest that, to the extent 
that HME MNCs come to prevail as ‘strong firms’ within their sectors and have their way in 
pioneering new approaches to HR, they may well set in train a dynamic wherein other 
existing firms within a given sector of a host economy come to emulate the practices of the 
dominant firm. This, for example, was witnessed by Royle (2006) in Italy where the 
indigenously-owned fast food outlet Autogrill came to imitate the practices of the newly-
arrived, but more dominant, McDonald’s. While we are unable to say with certainty that 
‘strong MNCs’ from emerging economies might come to play such a new ‘standard-bearer’ 
role, there is the early spectre that MiningCo has already come to occupy such a position in 
Canada’s mining industry.6 But while the ‘example’ of a ‘strong MNC’ may set in train an 
increasingly assertive posture among firms, both foreign and indigenous, within a given 
sector, it is arguable whether it would be accompanied by what we referred to earlier as an 
‘American sensibility’. Resources and competitive pressures are likely to work against such 
an entirely convergent outcome. 
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1
 MiningCo and NickelCo are pseudonymous. The MNC did not grant us permission to use their real names. 
2
 Non-managerial employees were not interviewed. As we were interested in the shape and intent of managerial 
practices it was thought more appropriate to interview management at different levels in the organisation as well 
as the most senior union representative.  
3
 The quote is obtained from the local provincial newspaper; its name is not provided to preserve the company’s 
identity. 
4
 The price of nickel fell from $37,225 in 2007 to $14,712 a tonne in 2009 (PricewaterhouseCoopers’, 2010).  
5
 We are grateful to one of our referees for suggesting this term to us. 
6 Witness the recent six month lockout at the Anglo-Australian MNC Rio Tinto Alcan in Quebec of 800 workers 
over proposals to use subcontract labour and reduce employees’ employment security. Here again claims of 
government collusion with, and support for, the interests of the management of the MNC loomed large as did 
allegations of the company hiring illegal replacement workers, and, in turn, the company pursuing legal 
injunctions against the union (see CBC, 2012; Rtuc Wordpress, 2012). 
